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Publications in Topoi by NOMIS researchers

Algorithmic Nudging: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Oversight

NOMIS Researcher(s)

Published in

April 3, 2023

Nudge is a popular public policy tool that harnesses well-known biases in human judgement to subtly guide people’s decisions, often to improve their choices or to achieve some socially desirable outcome. Thanks to recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) methods new possibilities emerge of how and when our decisions can be nudged. On the one hand, algorithmically personalized nudges have the potential to vastly improve human daily lives. On the other hand, blindly outsourcing the development and implementation of nudges to “black box” AI systems means that the ultimate reasons for why such nudges work, that is, the underlying human cognitive processes that they harness, will often be unknown. In this paper, we unpack this concern by considering a series of examples and case studies that demonstrate how AI systems can learn to harness biases in human judgment to reach a specified goal. Drawing on an analogy in a philosophical debate concerning the methodology of economics, we call for the need of an interdisciplinary oversight of AI systems that are tasked and deployed to nudge human behaviours. © 2023, The Author(s).

Research field(s)
Health Sciences, Psychology & Cognitive Sciences, Experimental Psychology

DOI
10.1007/s11245-023-09907-4

Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality

NOMIS Researcher(s)

Published in

July 1, 2021

Habitual actions have a history of practice and repetition that frees us from attending to what we are doing. Nevertheless, habitual actions seem to be intentional. What does account for the intentionality of habitual actions if they are automatically performed and controlled? In this paper, we address a possible response to a particular version of this issue, that is, the problem of understanding how the intention to execute a habitual action, which comes in a propositional format, interlocks with motor representations, which come in a motoric-pragmatic format. In order to solve this issue, we propose an account according to which the propositional intentions and the motor representations related to our habitual actions interlock through executable action concepts. This allows us to maintain that habitual actions can be, at the same time, automatically initiated, performed, and controlled and, still, intentional.

Research field(s)
Health Sciences, Psychology & Cognitive Sciences, Experimental Psychology

DOI
10.1007/s11245-020-09723-0

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