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Publications in Cognition by NOMIS researchers

NOMIS Researcher(s)

October 12, 2023

We question whether bradyphrenia, slowing of cognitive processing not explained by depression or a global cognitive assessment, is a nosological entity in idiopathic parkinsonism (IP). The time taken to break contact of an index finger with a touch-sensitive plate was measured, with and without a warning in the alerting signal as to which side the imperative would indicate, in 77 people diagnosed with IP and in 124 people without an IP diagnosis. The ability to utilise a warning, measured by the difference between loge-transformed reaction times (unwarned minus warned), was termed ‘cognitive efficiency’. It was approximately normally distributed. A questionnaire on self- and partner perception of proband’s bradyphrenia was applied. A multivariable model showed that those prescribed levodopa were less cognitively efficient (mean −5.2 (CI −9.5, −1.0)% per 300 mg/day, p = 0.02), but those prescribed the anti-muscarinic trihexyphenidyl were more efficient (14.7 (0.2, 31.3)% per 4 mg/day, p < 0.05) and those prescribed monoamine oxidase-B inhibitor (MAOBI) tended to be more efficient (8.3 (0.0, 17.4)%, p = 0.07). The variance in efficiency was greater within IP (F-test, p = 0.01 adjusted for any demographic covariates: coefficient of variation, with and without IP, 0.68 and 0.46, respectively), but not so after adjustment for anti-parkinsonian medication (p = 0.13: coefficient of variation 0.62). The within-participant follow-up time, a median of 4.8 (interquartile range 3.1, 5.5) years (101 participants), did not influence efficiency, irrespective of IP status. Perception of bradyphrenia did not usefully predict efficiency. We conclude that both bradyphrenia and ‘tachyphrenia’ in IP appear to have iatrogenic components, of clinically important size, related to the dose of antiparkinsonian medication. Levodopa is the most commonly prescribed first-line medication: co-prescribing a MAOBI may circumvent its associated bradyphrenia. The previously reported greater efficiency associated with (low-dose) anti-muscarinic was confirmed. © 2023 by the authors.

Research field(s)
Health Sciences

NOMIS Researcher(s)

Published in

July 12, 2021

What mental states are required for an agent to know-how to perform an action? This question fuels one of the hottest debates in the current literature on philosophy of action. Answering this question means facing what we call here The Challenge of Format Dualism, which consists in establishing which is the format of the mental representations involved in practical knowledge and, in case they are given in more than one format, explaining how these different formats can interlock. This challenge has generated two parallel debates: the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism on the one hand, and the debate on the Interface Problem on the other. While the former is about whether practical knowledge can be considered a species of propositional knowledge, the latter investigates how motoric and propositional states can be related. Here we offer a unified account capable of explicitly analyzing those two problems within the same philosophical framework. Our account suggests a new way for solving the Interface Problem that paves the way for addressing the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

Research field(s)
Arts & Humanities, Philosophy & Theology, Philosophy

NOMIS Researcher(s)

Published in

July 1, 2021

Habitual actions have a history of practice and repetition that frees us from attending to what we are doing. Nevertheless, habitual actions seem to be intentional. What does account for the intentionality of habitual actions if they are automatically performed and controlled? In this paper, we address a possible response to a particular version of this issue, that is, the problem of understanding how the intention to execute a habitual action, which comes in a propositional format, interlocks with motor representations, which come in a motoric-pragmatic format. In order to solve this issue, we propose an account according to which the propositional intentions and the motor representations related to our habitual actions interlock through executable action concepts. This allows us to maintain that habitual actions can be, at the same time, automatically initiated, performed, and controlled and, still, intentional.

Research field(s)
Health Sciences, Psychology & Cognitive Sciences, Experimental Psychology